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The analysis of American foreign policy has long been a favorite 
subject for historians, and the U.S. policy toward China during the 
1920s and 1930s has received its fair share of attention. Most authors 
dealing with this period have been content to trace carefully the course 
taken by U.S. policy makers during this period, pointing out where they 
went wrong, or defending the pol.icy as being the best possible given the 
situation. Some authors have presented biographical sketches of various 
major policymakers, analyzing th e role played by their policy maker. 
Nearly all include reasons a particular policy was followed or why a 
particular policymaker acted as he did. 
What were the major determinants of U.S. policy during the late 
1 920s and early 193 Os? This paper will present a summary of U.S. 
policy toward China from 1925 to 1937 to provide a background, followed 
by a description of the individuals in the State Department and the White 
House who had primary responsibility for the formulation of the China 
policy during this period and the role played by each. Next, the major 
factors that influenced the formation of poli c y will be discussed as well 
as the relative importance of each factor as measured by the actual 
policy followed. Finally, conclusions will be drawn as to the major 
determinants of U.S. policy toward China during this period. 
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SUMMARY OF U.S. POLICY FROM 1925 TO 1937 
Throughout the 19th and early 20th century U.S. policy toward 
China was one of obtaining and preserving the best possible atmosphere 
for U.S. trade with China. This Open Door policy was articulated in 
1900, in the Open Door notes written by Secretary of State John Hay. 1 
The Open Door policy supported the concept of equal opportunity for 
trade in China by all nations. As Western nations capitalized on China's 
weakness the unequal-treaty system evolved, giving the U.S. most 
favored nation status in trade as well as many other concessions that 
were demeaning to any sovereign nation. Extraterritoriality, allowing 
foreigners in China to be subject only to the laws of their own country, 
and the tariff treaties were particularly offensive to the Chinese. 
Tariffs in China were controlled and collected by Western nations, 
leaving Chinese industries unprotected against less expensive foreign 
imports. This state of affairs continued until growing nationalism and 
unrest in China after World War I resulted in the Washington Conference 
of 1921-22. 
The United States, Japan, Great Britain, France and five lesser 
powers participated in the Washington Conference which featured a 
cooperative approach toward China. They endorsed a continuing Open 
Door policy while agreeing to discuss the end of the unequal-treaty 
3 
system. The four major resolutions adopted w ere: first, to respect 
the sovereignty and independence of China; second, to provide opportunity 
for China to develop a stable government; t hird, to safeguard for the 
world, so far as it is within the U.S.'s  power, the principle of equal 
opportunity for the commerce and industry for all nations throughout 
the territory of China; fourth, to refrain from taking advantage of pre-
2 sent conditions in order to seek special rights and privileges. 
China had great hopes that the Washington Conference wou ld 
lead to the abolition of the unequal treaties, but the powers were very 
cautious to make promises only to discuss the matter later. They 
adopted a resolution that called for a Commission on Extra-territoriality 
to convene within three months of the conference, and for a special 
conference on the Chinese Customs Tariff. 
The Washington Conference did not fulfill China's hopes, but was 
judged a success by contemporary standards because many limited goals 
were achieved. It codified the Open Door policy by multilateral treaty, 
but it actually created more difficulties than it solved because the doc-
trine was violated more often than honored by the powers involved in 
the Washington Conference, including the U.S. Its main shortcoming 
was that it contained no enforcement provisions. 
During the early twenties the U.S. followed a double standard 
in their commercial policy toward China. It espoused the Open Door 
for other nations as specified in the Washington Conference, while only 
4 
selectively following such a course itself. The goal of this dual policy 
3 remained the same: American domination of world trade. 
By 1925, developments in China led to more serious considera-
tion of the tariffs and extraterritoriality by the powers. Based in Canton, 
the Kuomintang (KMT) led by Chiang Kai-shek capitalized on anti-foreign 
nationalist sentiment to pose a strong threat to the Peking government . 
This forced Peking to take a belligerent stance on the question of the 
unequal treaties. Unless they showed real progress in freeing China 
from them they were likely to lose what control they had. 
On May 30, 1925, an incident in Shanghai focused the attention of 
the U. S. public on China and raised Chinese anti-foreign feeling to the 
boiling point. British troops fired on an unruly Chinese mob inside the 
4 International Settlement and killed several Chinese. Less than a month 
later, on June 24th, the Chinese government in Peking demanded an 
overhaul of the unequal treaties. 5 U.S. Secretary of State Frank B. 
Kellogg was sympathetic to Chinese aspirations and agreed to talk about 
tariffs and ex traterritoriality, in that order. 6 
On October 26th a Special Tariff Conference opened with Silas H. 
7 Strawn, a prominent American businessman, as chairman for the U.S. 
Instead of satisfying the demands of moderate nationalism in China, the 
calling of the Special Tariff Conference increased the wrath of the Canton 
based Nationalists mainly because any agreement to abolish the tariff 
would fill the coffers of the Peking based government. To further muddy 
the waters, the Peking Provisional Government of Tuan Chi-jui toppled 
5 
in April, 192 6, raising the question of recognition for its successor or 
for some other government in China. The Tariff Conference was sus-
pended for lack of a government that co uld represent China. 
One other significant event during 1926 was the formation of a 
Commission on Extraterritoriality headed by the same Silas Strawn, 
chief U.S. negotiator at the Special Tariff Conference. In September 
the completed report of the Commission c oncluded that the powers could 
not relinquish extraterritoriality until the judiciary in China was pro-
8 tected against interference by the other branches of government. 
A primary goal of Nationalist diplomacy during the spring and 
summer of 1926 was to urge Western powers to pursue a policy of non-
recognition toward the Peking government. Because of the growing 
strength of the Nationalists and the total confusion in Peking the State 
Department decided not to recognize any government as being represen-
9 tative of China and to await further developments. It followed this 
policy for the next two years. 
In July, 1926, Chiang Kai-shek launched a military campaign 
north from Canton, the Northern Expedition, with the object of uniting 
the country by overthrowing imperialism and the military cliques, and 
freedom 1 0 to seek and equality for China. But Chiang was careful to 
clarify that anti-imperialism did not mean anti-foreignism. The Ameri-
can diplomatic community, however, was suspicious of Chiang's inten-
tions and soon relations with the Nationalists began to deteriorate. In 
September the Nationalists threatened to adjust the tariffs of their own 
accord in violation of the Washington Conference treaties. 
6 
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Again the United States di d not t ake a s t rong stand, but merely 
issued a formal protest in conjunction with t he other po w ers . The 
Nationalists replied they were prepared to negotiate on the tariffs and 
other matters as soon as the U.S. and t he other powers re cognized 
their government. Meanwhile, they adjusted the tariff schedule unilater-
ally as they had planned. 
The growing strength of t h e Canton government caused several 
nations to reevaluate th e ir policy to ward China. By D ecembe r, 1926, 
Great Britain had shifted its attention from the Peking regime to the 
Nationalist g ov ernmen t in the south. On Christmas day the British 
challenged th e leadership of the United States in policy to ward Ch i na 
by issuing a memorandum that most observers felt c alled for a new 
China policy. In essence, th e memorandum repudiated the Washi n gton 
Conference and announced that Great Britain was prepared to act unilater-
ally in adjusting its relations w ith China. In addition it indicated a w ill-
ingness to recognize the Nationalist government and a readiness to 
negotiate on treaty revision in the near future. 
12 
During the early part of 1927 the Kuomintang's Northern Expedi-
tion advanced down the Yangtze Valley, threatening Nanking and other 
cities w ith large Western populations. The Northern Expedition and the 
British Christmas Memorandum attracted a good deal of attention to 
Chinese nationalism in the U.S. press and in Congress. On January 4th 
Representative Stephen Porter introduced a resolution in the House of 
7 
Representatives which requested the President to negotiate revision of 
the tariffs and extraterritoriality treaties, unilaterally if necessary. 
Many of the major newspapers editori a liz ed on the Chinese situation, 
comparing it to the American revolution and urging the government to 
aid the Chinese who we re struggling for freedom from foreign oppress ion. 
On January 27, 1927, Secretary Kellogg issued a public state-
ment in response to all these pressures. It articulated U.S. policy 
towards China for the past several years; a policy of patience and 
watchfulness to be pursued until the time when new treaties could be 
negotiated be tw e en the U.S. and China to replace the old. The state-
ment also included two new provisions th a t indicated a greater willing-
ness to negotiate on the part of the U.S. The Americans were willing 
to deal wi th any representative who could represent both north and 
south factions, and to negotiate independently of the other Western 
nations. This second provision abandoned the cooperative solution 
adopted at the Washington Conference. 13 
This statement recovered the initiative and leadership in Far 
Eastern affairs th a t had been lost when the British had issued the 
Christmas Memorandum. The Chinese, however, were not particularly 
impressed by the statement. Their feeling was that it was nothing new; 
. 14 it merely reiterated previous policy statements. 
The Northern Expedition advanced much faster than anticipated, 
entering Nanking on March 25. That night and the next day many 
Westerners were harrassed and shot at, and the Western Legations were 
8 
looted 15 by Nationalist troops apparently acting under orders . This 
became known as the Nanking Incident and was a real stumbling block 
in Uni t ed States relations w ith the Nationalist government. 
Officials in the American Legation and businessmen in China 
urged harsh measures in retaliation, including the use of force to show 
the Nationalists that t he U .S. would not tolerate such actions. The 
St ate Department refused to impose sanctions, again taking a w ait and 
see attitude . In accordance with the January 27 statement the U.S. 
acted independently of the other powers. The only ev id ence of coopera-
tive action was to send identic notes co nd em nin g the incident. The U.S. 
refused to use any measures other than moral sanctions against the 
Chinese, although th e ir legation in Ch i na, the British, and most of th e 
other powers had indicated their willingness to use stronger sanctions, 
· 
16 including force. 
Throughout t the rest of 192 7 the Nationalists strengthened their 
hold on China while th e U.S. waited and watched. During this period 
the tariff negotiations were nearly at a standstill because conditions in 
China were so unsettled. During late 1927 Chiang Kai-shek consolidated 
his hold on the KMT and expelled the Communists who had been allowed 
to join the Kuomintang as individuals since 1923, from his ranks. 
Whereas in 1927 the powers were facing a patchwork of political convic-
tions in China, by spring of 1928 they saw a revitalized Kuomintang 
purged of left wing elements. This gave the U.S. a government with 
which to deal and on March 28-29, 1928, a settlement was reached 
9 
between U.S. and China on the Na n king Inc ident. Called the MacMurray-
Huang Fu agreement, it included an apology by the Nationalists for the 
in c ident and promised full compensation for losses incur red. This 
settlement opened the way for tarriff negotiations. On July 20 at a 
meeting between John Van Antwerp MacMurray, U.S. Minister to China, 
and T. V. Soong, the Nationalist Minister of Finance, both sides indi-
cated their will ingness to negotiate. An American draft of a treaty was 
quickly accepted and the completed treaty was signed on July 25. This 
agreement declared that China now possessed complete tariff autonomy 
in return for the continuance of U. S. most-favored nation status in 
China. It was a bilateral action between the U.S. and China. 1 7 
The action took the rest of the powers by surprise, as th e 
official statement announcing the beginning of talks had come only t wo 
days prior to the signing of the agreement. Again the U. S. had acted 
independently and taken the initiative in dealing with the Chinese problem. 
Shortly after this, MacMurray sent a note to the Chinese indica-
ting that everything the U.S. wanted to talk about had been covered in 
the tariff talks. For this he was reprimanded sharply by th e State 
Department which wanted the door left open for talks about extraterri -
. 18 toriality. 
When the Nationalists raised the question of de jure recognition 
for their government several weeks later, Kellogg answered that the 
signing of the tariff agreement constituted de jure recognition and that 
19 nothing else needed to be done. Although large steps had been taken 
10 
in abolishing the unequal treaties, continued internal disorder in China 
and failure to insure the safety of American lives and property made 
the U.S. reluctant to relinquish its extraterritorial rights. As a result 
de jure recognition and the tariff agreement did .not lead to any further 
signifi c ant changes in the U.S. position. 
In 1929 Herbert Hoover succeeded Coolidge as President of the 
United States and chose Henry L. Stimson as his Secretary of State. 
Both favored a continuance of Kellogg's policy toward China. In Nov-
ember, 1929, Nelson T. Johnson replaced MacMurray as American 
Minister to China, silencing the only significant U.S. policy maker who 
favored a hard line approach toward China. For nearly two years the 
State Department waited for evidence of grea ter unity and stability in 
China. By the summer of 1931 the Nationalists had made strides to-
ward greater stability and Johnson had nearly concluded an agreement 
with the Chinese on extraterritoriality when the situation changed drasti-
cally because of Japan's invasion on Manchuria. 
Immediately after the Mukden Incident of September 8, 1931, 
which marked the beginning of hostilities in Manchuria, the Chinese 
appealed to the League of Nations to resolve the conflict. Secretary of 
State Stimson insisted that the League should take the initiative, and 
felt that good progress had been made when on December 10 the League 
established a commission of inquiry headed by Lord Lytton, a diplomat 
from Great Britain. 
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Less than two days after this an event occurred which altered 
the State Department's outlook. The moderate members of the Japanese 
Cabinet on whom Stimson was dep ending to hol _d the military in check 
lost support and a more militant faction took over. They quickly 
decided to support the Japanese Kwantung army, which by January 1932 
occupied all of South Manchuria. Faced with these developments Secre-
tary Stimson took the initiative from the League and on January 7, 193 2 
issued a note to China and Japan that became known as the "Stimson 
Doctrine. 11 Essentially the U.S. refused to recognize any changes 
brought about by Japanese aggression in Manchuria in violation of 
previous treaties. 20 This nonrecognition policy was a moral sanction, 
stopping short of the use of force to prevent Japanese aggression. 
The Secretary hoped that the other powers would endorse his January 7 
statement, but none did. 
In late January the Japanese responded to an effective anti-
Japanese boycott in Shanghai by sending more troops to that city. 
Fighting broke out and the Japanese met surprisingly effective res is -
tance from the Chinese. After more than a month of fighting the Japan-
ese were forced to withdraw and hostilities ceased. 
The summer of 1932 was relatively quiet while everyone waited 
for the Lytton Commission to finalize its report. The report was finally 
made on October 2. It con demned the Japanese aggression in Manchuria 
and recommended the establishment of a government consistent with the 
12 
sovereignty and administrative integrity of China. After several months 
of disc us sion, the League adopted a resolution based on the Lytton 
Commission report which strongly condemned Japan's actions in Man-
churia. On February 25, 1933, the U.S. issued a statement endorsing 
21 the League's stand . The use of moral sanctions by th e League and 
the U.S. did not succeed in deterring Japan from aggression in China. 
Not only did the Japanese resign from the League of Nat ions, they also 
attacked and conquered the Chinese province of Jehol in l ess than two 
22 
weeks. 
On March 1 Presid ent Franklin D. Roosevelt took over the reins 
in the White House and was a bsorbed by the Great Depression. Cordell 
Hull, his Secretary of State, appeared bewildered by his new respon -
sibilities which left him depe n dant on the advice of the same professionals 
who had served under Stimson. 23 These professionals were becoming 
disillusioned with the existing peace system and pointed to the Manchur-
ian Incident as an example of the futility of moral sanctions in preserving 
wor ld peace. Joseph Grew, U.S. Ambassador to Japan, urged a policy 
of friendliness toward Japan as the best means of preserving peace, 
particularly after the Tangku Truce ended open hostilities between Japan 
and China for a while. 
On this note, the officials in the State Department began to 
reassess our policies in the Far East. The idea of promoting world 
order and peace through sanctions against aggressors was lo sing ground. 
Instead they were asking how the U.S. could best safeguard itself 
against an aggressive and antagonistic Japan. 
13 
During the summer of 1933 and again beginning in 1934 the 
Japanese protested vigorously against any foreign assistance to China, 
ostensibly because the only way to strengthen China was to let her do 
it herself with help from Japan, who had a special responsibility in 
East Asia. This policy was enunciated in the Amau Doctrine, in 1934, 
which warned Western nations not to give aid to China. 24 Shortly after 
this the State Department reevaluated its China policy in light of the 
increased possibility of conflict with Japan. As a result they did not 
seriously protest the Amau Doctrine, and in addition they recommended 
that no more financial aid be given to China. 
In 1 93 5 the U.S. was confron ted with two major developments 
in the Far East. Domestic U.S. legislation designed to raise the price 
of silver and benefit the silver producing states resulted in large amounts 
of silver leaving China because of higher prices elsewhere in the world. 
This undermined China's currency which was on the silver standard 
and left them in serious economic difficulties, leading to bitter feelings 
among the Chinese, who felt that insult had been added to injury. In 
addition to refusing financial aid which was sorely needed, the U.S. was 
following a policy that seriously undermined the Chinese economic 
situation. By the middle of 1936, however, an arrangement had been 
worked out between the U.S. Treasury and th e Chinese Ministry of 
Finance which offset the losses of silver incurred by our silver policy. 
14 
Th e other major developm ent was the c ontinued efforts b y Japan 
to extend c ontrol over all of China through diplomantic and economic 
means rather than through force. Throughout 1935 and 193 6 the pre-
vailing view in the State Departm ent was that a J a panese-dominated 
China w ould soon be an accomplished fact. But there was no move to 
oppose Japan. On the c ontrary, American policyma k ers concentrated 
on reaching an understanding w ith th e Japanese. 
In January, 1937, Johnson sent a summary of the developments 
in China during the last half of 193 6 in which he described the growing 
unity and nationalism of the Chinese people and their determination to 
25 
resist the Japa n ese. This trend continued through the first half of 
1937, but the Ameri c an governm ent and American businessmen remained 
relu c tant to participate in China's reconstructi on. The first sign of a 
possible c hange in Ameri c an attitu des c a m e in July 1937 when the Export-
Import Bank indicated its willingness to extend substantial credit to 
China. . 26 By this time, ho w ever, the outbreak of armed conflict between 
Japan and China led to a decision to postpone all action indefinitely. 
During the period from 1925-37 U.S. policy was essentially one 
of sympathetic noninterference in Chinese affairs. By 1925 the Canton 
Nationalists led by Chiang Kai-shek were a real threat to the Peking 
based government. The Shanghai Incident focused public attention on 
China's attempts to free herself from the unequal treaties and led to the 
Special Tariff Conference in October. In July of 1926 Chiang launched 
the Northern Expedition, advancing much faster than anyone expected. 
In December Great Britain recognized the changing situation in its 
Christmas Memorandum, indicating a willingness to deal with the 
Nationalists, thereby taking the lead in Far Eastern affairs from the 
u. s. 
Res-ponding to various pressures, Kellogg issued a general 
policy statement on January 27, 1927 that indi cated a greater willing-
ness to negotiate with the Nationalist government but con tinued to 
advocat e a wait , and -see noninterference policy. 
15 
The Nanking In cident was a severe t est of Kellogg's non-inter-
ference attitude, as Nat ionalist t roops looted the Western legations in 
Nanking and shot and killed several Westerners. Tenanciously he 
refused to use sanctions against the Nationalists, showing a willingness 
to act independently of other nations. A bilateral settlement of the 
Nanking Incident was reached in March, 1928, paving the way to a July 
agreement that gave China complete tariff automony. No further signi-
ficant progress was made in abolishing the unequal tr ea ties until shortly 
before the Manchurian invasion by the Japanese in 1931. This invasion 
promptly negated the progress made toward abolishing extra-territorial-
ity. Secretary of State Stimson continued earlier policy in response to 
the Manchuria crisis, adding the Stimson Doctrine of nonrecognition of 
any treaties between China and Japan that were in violation of earlier 
agreements. 
In response to the Amau Doctrine of 1934 the U.S. discontinued 
all forms of aid to China except moral support. By early 1937 the 
16 
economic outlook for China was more optimistic . The State Department 
considered helping China financially but again all plans were cancelled 
by the outbreak of armed co nfli ct between China and Japan. 
PERSONNEL AND RELATIONSHIPS IN THE 
STA TE DEPARTMENT 
17 
Any discussion of the formulation of U.S. foreign policy necess-
rily includes a discussion of the individuals in the State Department 
responsible for the formation of that policy. From 1925 to 1937 there 
was surprisingly little turnover among the professionals assigned to 
the Fa r East. In 1925 John Van Ant w erp MacMurray was the U.S. 
Minister to China, Ne lson T. Johnson was the Chief of the Far East 
Division in Washington, and Frank B. Kellogg was the Secretary of State 
under Coolidge. 
MacMurray was an old China hand who was often at odds with the 
conciliatory policy implemented by Johnson and Kellogg in Washington. 
From 1925 to 192 9, when he was replaced by Johnson, he consistently 
advocated a strict enforcement of the unequal treaties, with force to be 
used if necessary. He felt that all respect for U.S. foreign policy would 
be lost if the United States didn't back up their words with action. 
MacMurray also envisioned a much greater degree of cooperation be-
tween nations in formulating policy in China than the State Department 
envisioned. 
He constantly chafed at the tight rein kept on him by his superiors 
in Washington, feeling that he should be given a free hand in dealing with 
18 
events in China. In general he felt that the man on the spot was best 
1 
equipped to handle the situation. As violence and tension increased in 
China, State and MacMurray drifted farther apart. Toward the end of 
his tenure he became bitter that his recommendations we re rarely 
followed. MacMur ray felt also that conditions in China did not warran t 
abolishing the treaties and that th e U.S. should therefore stay with the 
Washington Conference formula which demanded maintainence of the 
treaty s y stem until the Chinese proved their capacity to govern. 
Nelson Johnson was, if not the architect of U.S. policy in the 
Far East, at least the biggest influence on Kellogg as he formulated 
U.S. China policy. Durin g the years 1925-1937 he served first as Chief 
of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs, then as Assistant Secretary of 
State for Far Eastern Affairs and finally as U.S. Minister to China. 
One underlying precept guided all his policy recommendations and 
decisions; the decision must be in the best interests of America. He 
may be called a Jeffersonian be cause many times his idea of the best 
interests of the U.S. appear to have been dictated by publi c opinion. 
Although he was certainly interested in the Chinese situation, he was 
remarkably consistent in not allowing his sympathies to influence his 
recommendations contrary to what he felt were the best interests of 
America. 
Frank B . Kellogg was industrious and devoted, but could hardly 
be called innovative or dynamic. One author has described him as "a 
busy mediocrity operating in a period when most Americans were 
19 
2 preo ccup i ed with domesti c affairs. " Kellogg had a deepseat ed steady 
good will toward China which was overshadowed by an almost pathologi-
cal sensitivity to domestic public opinion. This good will led him to 
sympathize with rather th an resist China's attempts to get rid of the 
unequal treaties. Kellogg's attitudes were reflected in the basic prin-
ciples of American policy; a conciliatory approach wh ich consisted of 
sympathy for Nationalist as pi rations, protection of American lives and 
property, and nonintervention in internal affairs . 
President Coolidge had little interest and offered no leadership 
in Far Eastern affairs. He usually left Far East Asia policy to the 
State Department. From 1925 to 1928 policy was guided by Kellogg , 
who reli e d heavily on Johnson for expert advice. Coolidge acquiesced 
in decisions made by the State Department while MacMurray could be 
trusted to carry out orders faithfully even though he generally disagreed 
with them. 
The State D epa rtm ent response to the Nanking Incident of Ma rch, 
1927, is p erhaps t he best i llu strat ion of the relationship s between 
MacMurray, Johnson, Kellogg, and Coolidge. It was a severe test to 
Kellogg's conciliatory approach because the attack of Nationalist troops 
upon Wes tern legations and personnel raised serious questions about 
the responsibility and intentions of the Nationalists. 
MacMurray urged prompt and servere sanctions against the 
Na tionalists, including the use of force. He also urged cooperative 
action among the Western powers, in th e spirit of the Washington 
20 
Conference, warning that the slightest show of weakness would endang e r 
American lives and property in all areas controlled by the advancing 
Nationalist armies. 
With astonishing tenacity Kellogg, supported by Johnson, refused 
to use any kind of sanctions against the Nationalists. By refusing to 
join with the other Western powers in using sanctions, he effectively 
abandoned th e cooperative approach. Instead he continued his wait and 
see attitude. His only real response was the suspension of any progress 
on tariff and extraterritoriality talks. 
Later in 1927, when the Nationalists invaded Shanghai, MacMurray 
urged that several thousand troops be sent to protect the integrity of the 
International Settlement. Instead, Kellogg sent a token fore e of 250 troops 
to be used only to protect American lives and property. 3 He was careful 
to keep the force small enough to avoid the appearance of interfering in 
Chinese internal affairs. Coolidge apparently approved Kellogg's actions, 
but gave no personal direction in the crisis. 
In August, 1927, a new personality entered as Stanley K. Horn-
beck became Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs. Nelson K. 
Johnson was promoted to Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs. 
Hornbeck was another insider who had been working in the Far Eastern 
Division for many years and no significant alteration of policy took place 
as a result of the change. 
The Kellogg-Johnson-Hornbeck policy sought to come to terms 
with Chinese nationalism. As a result, once Chiang Kai- shek had 
21 
subdued Peking, the U.S. was in a good position to negotiate treaty 
revision with the new government. After the settlement of the Nanking 
Incident, the tariff agreement guaranteeing tariff autonomy for China 
followed quick ly. Att ention then turned to the problem of extraterritori 
ality. This problem appears to have consumed most of Johnson's time 
during his remaining one and a half years as Assistant Secretary of 
State, while Kellogg's attention was attracted to other parts of the world, 
particularly Latin America. Again the U.S. waited for the Nationalists 
to stabilize the situation enough to insure the protection of U.S. life and 
property. 
In April of 1929 the Hoover administration took over and Kellogg 
was replaced by Henry L. Stimson, but the rest of the State Department 
personnel concerned with China remained essentially the same except 
for some changes in assignments, and so did the China policy. Frus-
trated by his lack of influence on China policy, John MacMurray re-
signed as U.S. Minister to China and was replaced by Nelson Johnson 
in November. 
After Johnson's arrival in China he felt even more strongly that 
noninterference was in the best interest of the U.S. He felt that if the 
U.S. stepped in to help China it would have to substitute its elf for the 
government of China; once the U.S. got in it would never be able to get 
4 
out. Even without much aid by the U.S. the Nationalists had made 
some progress toward stability by 1931. Johnson and his Chinese 
counterpart had nearly concluded an agreement on extraterritoriality 
during the summer of 1931, but in September all negotiations were 
halted because of the invasion of Manchuria by Japan. 
22 
This crisis brought China policy under the personal direction of 
Secretary Stimson, but once again the U.S. policy of noninterference, 
sympathy fo r the Chinese aspirations, and a wait and see attitude 
remained the same. At first Stimson thought that the moderate elements 
of the government in Tokyo would prevail and aggression in Manchuria 
would cease. But even after the government in Tokyo fell and the 
militants took over, he used only moral sanctions against the Japanese, 
and provided no positive support to the Ch inese. This may have been a 
result of President Hoover 1 s philosophy of foreign policy. Hoover con-
sidered moral force as the ultimate sanction, wh il e Stimson believed that 
moral force should be backed by a willingness to u se military force as 
a last resort. 6 
After two years of aggression were halted by the Tangku truce 
of 1933, Johnson 1 s analysis of the situation remained un changed. Even 
the very real threat of a Japanese controlled China did not move him to 
recommend any change in policy. He felt that there was little chance 
for the Nationalists to unify the country: Although allegedly representa-
tive of all China, the Nationalist government actually controlled only the 
provinces in the lower Yangtze River area. Economically he felt that 
the situation there "probably does not mean the loss of a dollar from an 
American purse." 7 
In 1933 another change in the White House brought little or no 
change in State Department policy. The new President, Franklin D. 
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Roosevelt, was much more concerned with the domestic economic crisis 
than he was about China. Besides concentrating on the London Economic 
Conference the new Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, knew little about 
the Far East, and left most formulation of policy to Hornbeck and John-
son. During 1933 Hornbeck seems to have been much less critical of 
the KMT than Johnson, but less optimistic about the chances of success 
h h L C . . 8 t ant e ytton omm1ss10n was. 
Shortly after the Arnau doctrine of 1934 in which Japan warned 
the U.S. not to give aid to China, Hull asked the Far Eastern Division 
to review the conciliatory policy of the U.S. toward China to deterrnine 
if it should be altered to avoid friction with Japan. The Far Eastern 
Di vision recommended two things; first, that the U.S. should proceed 
on its customary course as if nothing had happened, emphasizing that 
the U.S. should not lead in opposing Japan. Second, it recommended 
that no further financial aid be given to China. 9 
The Roosevelt administration's China policy from 1934 to 1937 
was simply to avoid antagonizing Japan, but it stopped short of giving 
Japan its moral support. It reserved its moral support for China in 
lieu of military and economic aid. Although early 193 7 saw Johnson 
10 becoming cautiously optimistic about China's progress and even 
encouraging private economic investment in China, the outbreak of 
armed conflict later in the year began another era in U.S. - China relations. 
24 
In sum, it appears that during relatively peaceful times China 
policy was left in the hands of middle echelon State Department officials 
such as Hornbeck and Johnson, who remained on the scene from 1925 
to 1937. MacMurray was the lone opponent of a conciliatory policy, 
and resigned as Minister to China in 1929. 
The three Secretaries of State, Kellogg, Stimson, and Hull, 
appear to have personally directed China policy only during times of 
crisis, although Kellogg took a larger interest than the other two and 
set the tone of the policy that the U.S. followed until 193 7. Presidential 
involvement was minimal and limited to approval of the State Depart-
ment actions, although Hoover's personal philosophy of the importance 
of moral force and all three President's sensitivity to politi cal pressure 
and public opinion did influence policy to some degree. 
The extremely low turnover in key State Department personnel 
appears to be a major factor in the remarkable consistency of U.S. 
policy toward China during the years from 19 25 to 193 7. But although 
the personalities of these men played a significant part in the formation 
of policy, they were also subject to various external pressures that 
were the key factors in the determination of policy. The identification 
of these pressures and the role played by each in the formulation of 
U.S. policy will be examined in the following pages. 
PUBLIC OPINION 
The greatest single influence on the State Department in the 
formation of policy was domesti c public opinion as expressed through 
the ne w spapers, and by Congress. The reason for this can be found 
partl y in the personalities of the men in the State Department respon-
sible for the China policy, and partly in the political realities that 
confront every administration. 
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Both Se c retary of State Kellogg and Nelson Johnson recognized 
the value of a policy supported by domestic opinion, while Stanley K. 
Hornbeck stated in one of his talks on foreign policy, "Policy makers 
are not merely influenced by what we call public opinion: they are sensi-
·t "1tively receptive and responsive to 1 • 
Kellogg I s foreign policy was consistent with domestic public 
opinion and his personal views. Throughout his entire incumbency he 
was extremely conscious of public opinion. It may be argued that his 
2 personal attitudes were formed by public opinion. At any rate, not one 
major policy decision concerning China during his tenure in office was 
in opposition to public opinion; and many of his policy statements appear 
to have been made as a result of pressure from the public. 
Johnson's chief determinant in forming policy was that the 
decision must be in the best interest of the United States. However, in 
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almo s t every c ase he defined t he best int e rests of the U .S. in terms of 
the prevailing public opini on. 
Although St imson was not swayed personally by public opinion, 
Hoover w as ex t remely consc i ous of his failing popularity due to t he 
domestic econom i c crisis, and S ti mson was not allo wed to act contr ar y 
to public opi nion in any way. Secretary of State Hull and President 
Roosevelt co nti nued in much t he same vein. 
An examina tion of U.S. poli cy during t he period from 1925 to 
1 93 7 shows how closely th e policy mirror e d public opinion. Af ter the 
Shanghai Incident of 1 925 brought the Chinese situation into th e public 
eye, Ke ll ogg agreed to di sc uss a broad ran ge of issu es at a Sp ec ial 
Tariff Conference . In doing s o he felt that he r eflected public and co n-
3 gressional attitudes. 
Du ring t he early part of 1927, missionary influen ces and news -
pap er reports of in c idents in China coincided with public hearings on 
the Porter r e solution which brou gh t Sino-American relations m u c h 
publi ci ty. Most newspapers and members of Congress likened the 
events in China to the American Revolution, highlighting the attempts 
of an oppressed people to get out from under the heavy hand of foreign 
powers. Most major newspapers editorialized on the situation in China, 
thus forming strong opinions that prepared them for the Nanking Incident 
a few months later. 
The Porter resolution and the sentiments expressed by Congress 
had a very direct effect on Kellogg's policy statement of January 27, 1927. 
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The statement actually was amended to use part of the language of the 
Porter resolution: "to enter into negotiations with any government of 
. 4 China or delegates who can represent or speak for China. 11 This 
agreement to deal with any person who could represent both Peking and 
Canton factions was a major policy shift that was undertaken primarily 
to placate the public. Also, Congress and the papers were pushing for 
unilateral action if necessary and Kellogg includ ed this idea in his final 
draft. 
When the Nanking Incident occurred the press was well prepared 
to assume an aggressive role and cry against intervention. Other public 
sentiment strongly opposed any military action except for protection of 
American life and property. As a result Kellogg abandoned the coopera-
tive approach. He also refused pressure from MacMurray to use econo-
mic and military sanctions against the Nationalists. In opposing the use 
of sanctions State was again in line with the American press and public 
. . 5 
op1n1on. 
When Shanghai was invaded and MacMurray urged that troops 
be sent to maintain the integrity of the International settlement, Kellogg 
replied: 
It is necessary for you to understand that American 
sentiment is very strongly opposed to military action in China 
by this government except for protecting American life and 
property. NO sentiment exists here that would support any 
military action on the part of this government for the object 
of maintaining present status and integrity of the International 
Settlement and Shanghai. 6 
Kellogg finally sent 250 troops--a token for c e that w ould not bring 
accusations of interfering with C h inese affairs. 
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Wh e n Stimson took over in 1929, MacMurray still favored 
forming a cooperative policy toward China in cooperation with the other 
powers. Stimson, like Kellogg, deferred to public opinion which he 
believ e d favored an independent rather than cooperative approach. 
In response to the Manchurian crisis the U.S. n1aintained its 
wait-and-see policy and gave moral support to Leag e of Nations initia-
tives to settle the problem. This policy reflected the realities of A meri-
ca's meager economic interest in Manchuria, and domestic public opin-
ion. Although Stimson presented arguments in favor of sanctions against 
Japan to Hoover, Hoover stood adamantly against them, again in line 
with public opinion. 
From 1933 to 193 7, Unit e d Stat e s, China policy was evaluated in 
light of the possibility of conflict with Japan. Again public opinion forced 
this change for two reasons. Above all the U.S. public wanted to avoid 
war and Japan posed a much greater threat militarily than China. Also 
American businessmen had stronger ties with Japan than with China and 
wanted the State Department to do nothing to endanger their relationship 
with Tokyo. Consequently, the State Department decision to avoid fric-
tion with Japan even at the expense of China's reconstruction was sup-
. 7 ported by public opinion as expressed through the leading newspapers. 
In 193 5 when our silver policy seriously damaged the Chinese 
economy, Hull was unwilling, because of domestic pressures from 
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Congress, to try to change the U.S. sil ver policy or give financial aid 
to China to offset the damage done. 
As illustrated above, public opinion was the dominant factor in 
the State Department's formulation of U.S. policy toward China. In 
almost every case U.S. policy was in complete accord with public 
opinion, and in many cases was a direct response to public pressure. 
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INSTABILITY IN C:HINA 
The dis unity and instability of the government in China was 
another contributing factor as the State Department formulated policy. 
Although most Americans believed that strong, unified and independent 
China w as th e best m eans of maintaining the security of American inter-
ests in China, actual U.S. policy was based on China's lack of power and 
her dis unity. 
The Washington Conference, called partly in response to growing 
nationalism in China, ended with agreements to abolish tariffs and ex-
tra-territoriality contingent on the establishment of stability in China. 
It is interesting to note, however, that there was no American plan that 
actively provided for development of a strong, unified China. The U.S. 
policy was a negative hands off policy with the State Department wish-
fully thinking that somehow China would strengthen herself. The result 
was a vicious circle. Chinese disunity prevented implementation of 
treaty agreements which would in turn have contributed towards a strong 
unified government. 
Many other repercussions came as a result of Chinese disunity. 
A strong united China would have encouraged U.S. investment and trade, 
which would have made U.S. economic ties with China stronger than the 
ties w ith Japan, lessening Japan's influence on U . S. foreign policy 
toward China. 
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In the final analysis, Chinese disunity and weakness was the 
reason behind most of the crisis situations during the years 1925-1937. 
Most policy decisions from the Washing ton Conference, to the January 
27th statement, to the Nanking Inc _id ent were American responses to 
disunity. From 1933 to 1937 Japanese aggression and American deference 
to Japanese wishes and American public opinion were all based on Chinese 
weakness. 
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MISSIONARIES IN CHINA 
In 1925, 4, 000 to 5, 000 of the 9,800 Americans in China we re 
American Protestant missionaries. In general, most of t he missionaries 
felt that blaming China for disorder was ridiculous, and felt that the U.S. 
government should act quickly and decisively to treat China as an equal 
nation. 
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As far as being sympathetic to Chinese aspirations, missionary 
opinion coincided with State Department policy. But their desire that the 
\ 
U.S. act quickly and decisively to abolish the tariffs and extraterritori-
ality did not materialize. 
Th e direct influence of missionaries in China upon the State 
2 Department was negligible. But indirectly through their respective 
mission boards in the U.S. and through letters and other correspondance 
written to friends and influential people at home, they did have some 
impact on domestic public opinion. 
The missionaries were most vocal during the period from 19 25 
until the Nanking Incident after which they failed to take much interest 
in political affairs. This can perhaps be attributed to the fact that due 
to persecution by the Nationalists fewer missionaries were enthusiastic 
about abolishing extraterritoriality and other protections afforded by 
the unequal treaties, particularly since they owned at least $40,000,000 
worth of property and in vestments in China. 3 
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Much of the public concern in this country can be traced to 
missionary influences. Liberal 1nis sionary organizations such as the 
National Christian Council of China and the International Missionary 
Council supported the Nationalists and revision _of the unequal treaties. 
At least one author attributed introduction of the Porter Resolution in 
January 1927 to missionary interests. The initiative certainly did not 
come from the State Department, who agreed in principle but felt that 
the timing was bad . 
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During the hearings on the Porter resolution, 
strong support came from 1nissionary and academic inter ests but no 
organized opposition appeared. 
In general, most missionaries in China sympathized wi th the 
Nationalist aspirations of the Chinese, but became considerably less 
sympathetic and less voca l when their lives and considerable proper t y 
were threatened by the advance of Chiang Kai-shek ' s armies in 1927. 
Their correspondance to friends and relatives, and public support of 
their missionary boards a t home had considerable impact on domestic 
public opinion. 
T RA DE AND I NVESTMENT : BUSINESSMEN 
AN D OUR BUSINESS INTERESTS 
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When one co nsiders that the entir e t h ru s t of American foreign 
policy toward China from 1850 until 1925 had been to establish and 
maintain the princip l e of the Op en Do o r for American trade and invest -
ment an explana t ion is r equi r ed to understand why businessmen and our 
trade and investment in China had so li ttle influence on the State D epart-
me nt. 
Th e most voacl group r ep r ese ntin g American business inter es ts 
in China was t he American Chamber of Comme r ce in Shanghai. Th e y 
mounted a widespread campa i gn designed to influence U.S. policy toward 
China. They w rote their Congressmen and en t ert ained visiting dignitaries. 
Lobbyists were dispatched to Washington, such as George B ron so n Rea, 
who urged the State Department to enforce our treaties rigidly. 1 The 
Chamber of Commerce and other businessmen wanted two things from the 
State Department; strict enforcement and continuance of the unequal 
treaties, and protection of American lives and property in China by force 
if necessary. They reflected Ma cM urray' s hardline stance, feeling that 
any sign of weakness would result in the loss of their business interests. 
For example, the American Chamber of Commerce in Shanghai 
was particularly vocal in castigating Kellogg's handling of the Nanking 
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incident. They favored the use of harsh sanctions against the Nationa-
2 lists. When the Nationalist troops approached Shanghai they passed a 
unanimous resolution calling for the U.S. government to cooperate fully 
3 in protecting the international settlement . As mentioned before, the 
U.S. responded with a token force of 250 troops to be used only for the 
prote c tion of American lives and property. 
This points out the major difference in thinking between the State 
Department and the businessmen in China. State felt an obligation to 
defend American lives and property, but was not willing to risk a major 
military confrontation to do it. Also, the diplomats paid lip service to 
the unequal treaties, but in practice they felt that strict enforcement of 
the treaties was not in the best interests of America. In fact the State 
Department warned businessmen that they were largely at the mercy of 
their Chinese hosts and would have better success if they came to their 
own agreements with the Chinese rather than depend on the U.S. to pro-
h . . 4 tect t e1r interests. 
Instead of following a positive policy to strengthen and stabilize 
China, producing a favorable climate for trade and investment, the U.S. 
followed a strict hands off policy, even discouraging private investors 
and money leaders by telling them the government could not guarantee 
their investment. This policy was reinforced in 1934 when in response 
to the Arnau doctrine the U.S. cut off the small amount of government aid 
it was providing to the Chinese. These all indicate that the business 
community was not very influential in China policy. This lack of 
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influence can be attributed to two major reasons first, our investments 
1n China compared to our investment s elsewhere 1n the world we re 
quite insignificant, and therefore considered as not being vital to 
America's well-being . Second, even in the Eas.t Asian area our commer-
cial ti es and investments w ith Japan were viewed as having more poten-
tial and as being more important than our ties w ith China. 
Duri ng the period und er discussion both the Commerce and State 
Departments were aware that the fabled China market was a myth, and 
that vast populations do not mean vast rnarkets. Commerce felt th at by 
1931 China had very nearly approached the limits of her potential buying 
capa c ity, not only at that time but for some years to come. Listed 
were several factors limiting trade potential: illiteracy and extreme 
poverty, difficulty of language, lack of rapid and cheap transportation, 
and especially political and administrative uncertainty. 5 
On a par capita basis, U.S. investment in China was very small 
compared to other underdeveloped countries. There were several rea-
sons for this. Most capital went to underdeveloped countries, such as 
Australia, that had many immigrants from western countries. Very few 
Americans ever immigrated to China. Also, most foreign investment in 
other underdeveloped countries was for production destined for export to 
indu s trialized countries, a colonial type investment. Finally, despite 
set backs, China successfully prevented economic penetration in the 
interior. Even in China, American investments amounted to only 6. 1% 
of the total foreign investments in China in 1931. 6 As viewed by the State 
37 
Department, then, trade and investment in China was not a vital part of 
our world commercial interests. 
Although total foreign investment in Japan was only 42% of the 
investm e nt in China, on a per capi ta basis investment in Japan was 
nearly three times as high as that in China . 7 In addition, internal 
conditions in Japan were relatively stable and represented less risk than 
an investment in China. When weighed in the balance, most U. S. busi--
nes smen agreed with the State Department that our commercial rela-
tions with Japan were more important than those with China. 
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JAPAN'S INFLUENCE ON CHINA POLICY 
Beginning with the Manchurian crisis in 1931, U.S. concern for 
good relations with Japan·outweighed its desire to maintain the Open 
Door in China. The primary goal of the U.S. during the 3 0 1 s was to 
prevent the threat of war with Japan from increasing rather than to 
champion China as has sometimes been contended. 
The State Department could have adopted any of three rnethods to 
reduce the threat of war with Japan. It could have approved of the 
Japanese actions, it might have opposed them, or it could have done 
nothing. Between the Manchuria crisis in 1931 and the announcement 
of the Arnau doctrine in April 1934, the State Departm ent attempted to 
get the League of Nations to take the lead in condemning Japanese actions 
in China, then used unilateral moral sanctions to prevent Japanese 
aggression. It only succeeded in raising anti- U.S. sentiment in Japan 
to alarming levels. After the Arnau doctrine was announced the State 
Department followed a hands off policy, giving China no financial or 
military support for fear of arousing the wrath of Japan. 
In 1933, T. V. Soong, China's Minister of Finance, traveled 
abroad to organize a committee designed to arrange for reconstruction 
loans for China. One of the American businessmen he approached was 
Thomas L amo nt, who had headed an earlier Chinese Consortium 
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designed to increase investment in China. This time Lamont refused to 
serve because Japanese representatives were no t included on the com-
mittee. J. P. M organ, Lamont's company, did a lot of business with 
Japan and he didn't wan t to endanger the company 's relati onsh ip with 
1 Tokyo. 
Soong also sought support from t he State Department which was 
worried about deteriorating relations wi th Japan. State reminded Soong 
that China had not paid off previous debts, therefore how could the U.S. 
think of encouraging their people to loan them any more? 2 
State Department r eluct ance to antagonize Japan is also reflected 
in the U .S . response to the Arnau Doctrine, and in the willingness of the 
State Department to give financial aid to China to offset damage done by 
U.S. silver policy in 1935. Although in early 1937 the State Department 
was cautiously optimistic about China's chances for survival and its ec-
onomic outlook, the U.S. still offered no positive support because of 
fear of Japan. 
Underlying the entire poli cy however, was the fact that above all 
the U.S. public did not want war. This is why the State Department was 
so conscious and responsive to Japan. They posed the greatest threat to 
peace. In addition, the business community supported a friendly attitude 
towards Japan because of extensive commercial interests that outweighed 
intere sts in China. 
Each of the determinants of policy that have been discussed in 
this paper had a role in the formulation of U.S. policy toward China. 
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The key individuals in the State Department, Johnson, Hornbeck, Kellogg, 
Stimson, and Hull, were all very responsive to public opinion. Johnson 
was responsive because he felt his decisions must be in the best interest 
of Amer ica. He defined the best inter est of America as being what the 
public wanted. Kellogg's personality made him extremely conscious 
and sensitive to public opinion, while Stimson and Hull adhered to public 
opinion because of political necessity. Public opinion, then, was the 
most important direct influence on the U. S. policy toward China. 
Japan's influence on United States I China policy and the internal 
disorder and instability in China were two other important factors that 
tempered, and yet were related to publi c opinion. From 1925 to 1933 
the U.S. public reacted sympathetically to Chinese nationalist aspira-
tions, comparing the situation in China to the American Revolution. Yet 
this same struggle of the Chinese people to free themselves from the 
unequal treaties led to chaos and disorder that prevented the State Depart-
ment from abolishing extraterritoriality and oth .erwis e fulfilling Chinese 
nationalist aspirations. In addition, public opinion advocated noninter 
ference in Chinese affairs, thus preventing the State Department from 
pursuing any active, positive policy designed to strengthen and stabilize 
China. From 1933 to 1937 the threat of war with Japan became the pre-
dominant factor influencing the State Department to continue their non-
interference policy, and to discontinue all economic assistance and 
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investment. This was due to the fact that above all else the U.S. public 
wanted peace. 
Missionary interests influenced U.S. policy indirectly by in-
fluencing public opinion. Missionaries in China corresponded with 
influential people in the United States, telling them of the plight of the 
Chinese people. Missionary boards in the United States issued public 
statements supporting Chin es e pleas for freedom from the Unequal 
Treaties. These actions caught the attention of both the press and 
Congress, the most visible elements of public opinion. Active support 
from missionaries for Chinese aspirations lessened considerably after 
the Nanking Incident in 1927. 
Businessmen in China strongly supported the unequal treaties, 
fearful of the consequences of being left without the protection afforded 
by the treaties. Businessmen in the U.S., particularly after 1933, felt 
that U.S. economic ties with Japan were more important than U.S. ties 
with China. They agreed with the State Department decision to maintain 
good relations with Japan at the expense of China because investment in 
Japan promised a bigger and safer return than investment in China. 
They represented an influential segment of public opinion that the State 
Department did not ignore. 
In sum, public opinion was the most important determinant of 
State Department policy toward China from 1 925 to 193 7. Instability in 
China, and Japan I s attitude toward China influenced the State Department 
directly. Both of these factors a l so affected public opinion, which in turn 
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affe c ted State Department policy. Businessmen in China had little 
influence on either public opinion or the individuals in the State Depart-
ment. Businessmen in the U.S. were an important segment of public 
opinion. They felt that in the overall picture U. S. investments in China 
were not ve ry significant, and less important than U.S. inve stmen ts in 
Japan. Missionaries in China and their missionary boards at home had 
little direct influence on the State Department, but influenced public 
opinion significantly. 
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